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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the pharmaceutical industry, regulation of biological drugs creates 
unprecedented challenges to the formulation of innovative patents in the 
intellectual property field.1  Revenue once generated by these companies is now 
threatened by health care reform, increased competition, and government 
regulation in bringing new drugs to market.2 
Biological drugs are products manufactured “from living matter or 
manufactured in living cells using recombinant DNA biotechnologies.”3  They 
comprise a wide range of medical products including “vaccines, blood and 
blood components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and 
recombinant therapeutic proteins.”4  Biologics are made of “sugars, proteins, or 
nucleic acids or complex combinations of these substances, or may be [from] 
living entities such as cells and tissues.”5  In the United States, these specialty 
drugs have become increasingly popular for their ability to treat medical 
conditions where conventional drugs fail.6 
Although drug sales are predicted to rise by more than four percent in 
2014,7 there still remains a looming threat to break-through innovations in the 
biomedical industry: the newly enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(AIA).8  The AIA makes extensive alterations to the U.S. patent framework by 
attempting to harmonize the U.S. system with international patent law.9  It does 
this by changing the U.S. patent filing system from a first-to-invent standard to 
 
1. Accenture, Six Tech Trends That Will Shape the Pharmaceutical Industry in 2013, INDUS. 
WEEK, Dec. 10, 2012, available at http://www.industryweek.com/emerging-technologies/six-tech-
trends-will-shape-pharmaceutical-industry-2013. 
2. Id. 
3. FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG 
COMPETITION i (2009), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P083901biologicsreport.pdf. 
4. What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/ucm133077.htm (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2013). 
5. Id. 
6. Id.  Conventional drugs are chemically synthesized products with known chemical structures.  
Id. Biologics on the other hand, are complex mixtures that are not easily identifiable or characterized.  
Id.  “Biological products . . . tend to be heat sensitive and susceptible to microbial contamination.  
Therefore, it is necessary to use aseptic principles from initial manufacturing steps, which is also in 
contrast to most conventional drugs.”  Id. 
7. Katie Thomas, U.S. Drug Costs Dropped in 2012, but Rises Loom, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 
2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/business/use-of-generics-produces-an-unusual-drop-in-
drug-spending.html?hp&_r=1&. Drug sales are expected to rise due to economic growth in 
international markets, fewer brand-name drugs losing patent protection, the influx of newly insured 
patients under new federal health care law.  Id. 
8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA 2011), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
9. Candice Decaire et al., Negotiating A New Legal Landscape: The Advent of Follow-On 
Biologics, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 1029, 1058 (2012). 
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a first-to-file standard.10  The new filing system provides “greater certainty for 
inventors that their patent will not be invalidated by someone [claiming] an 
earlier date of invention.”11 
However, in the biopharmaceutical context, the AIA puts additional 
pressure on biomedical companies to patent biological inventions earlier in the 
research and development (R&D) process.  The biotechnological industry is 
extremely competitive, and drug companies require a large amount of capital 
to research and develop innovative products.  These funds are acquired from 
private investors, who prefer investing in companies with patent protected 
innovations.  Without patent protection, venture capitalists are wary of 
providing capital because it might become too easy for competitors to undercut 
the biomedical company’s market price with their own similar drugs.12  Now 
that the U.S. patent filing system has changed from a first-to-invent standard to 
a first-to-file standard, biopharmaceutical companies will be forced to file 
provisional applications earlier in the R&D process, or risk pre-emption from 
competing firms, which could deter investors from providing capital to the 
business for future R&D of drugs. 
Therefore, pressure to avoid being pre-empted by competitors will cause 
biologic companies to file provisional applications prematurely, which will 
result in overly broad biological patents that fail to meet the 35 U.S.C. § 112 
disclosure requirements.  However, due to the unpredictable nature of 
biotechnology, the USPTO will likely approve many of these patent 
applications.  Furthermore, market exclusivity, which is granted to biologic 
drugs approved by the FDA, will also exacerbate the situation by enabling 
biomedical firms to file overly broad patents on biologic drugs, and by allowing 
them to maintain their product monopolies in the field, even if their patents are 
later invalidated. 
As a result, the new rules will induce the production of poorly constructed 
patents that fail to fully and completely characterize biological products.13  
These non-innovative patents will be susceptible to validity challenges, but 
competitors will not contest their validity due to regulatory provisions under 
the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA).14 
 
10. See AIA 2011. 
11. Decaire, supra note 9. 
12. Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC 
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 9–10 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/science/sci-tech/
24508541.pdf. 
13. Id. Poor patent claim construction is a result of overly narrow/broad language in the 
specification section of the patent. 
14. Id. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §§ 7001–7003, 
124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010). 
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This Comment explores the unanticipated effect the AIA will have on 
biological patents under the BPCIA starting March 16, 2013, and the need for 
modification of the BPCIA to maintain innovation in the biopharmaceutical 
field. Specifically, there are two viable ways to safeguard innovation in the 
biologic field: (1) by modifying the BPCIA so that market exclusivity is 
withdrawn upon invalidation of a biological patent, or (2) denying biological 
inventors the ability to file provisional patents. 
Part II of the paper presents background on the regulatory history of 
biological patents in the United States.  Part III describes the patent provisions 
(pre-AIA and post-AIA) relevant to analyze the BPCIA.  Part IV defines the 
role of market exclusivity in patents.  And, Part V explains the dangers of 
granting market exclusivity to biologics in a first-to-invent system, and viable 
solutions to ensure continued innovation in the biomedical industry. 
II.  THE REGULATORY HISTORY OF BIOLOGICS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Regulation of biological products began in the nineteenth century when 
pharmacies became the common source for medicine.15  It was during this time 
that the use of vaccines in the United States became prevalent, and 
governmental agencies and public laboratories began providing vaccination 
services to the general public.16  However, regulation of drugs was thought to 
be a state responsibility, rather than a federal matter.17  It was not until the 1890s 
that the federal government became significantly involved in “vaccination 
science and policy.”18 
Before federal oversight existed, the popularity of biological treatments 
enticed private entities to manufacture vaccines and antitoxins at a scale never 
seen before.19  Many small firms engaged in dishonest behavior, such as 
providing fake smallpox vaccines, and producing contaminated batches of 
medicine sold to the general public.20  These drugs caused the death of thirteen 
children, and consequentially, Congress’s foray into biologic regulation.21 
 
15. David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to 
Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and 
Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 145 (2005). 
16. Id. at 146. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. Margaret Pittman, The Regulation of Biological Products, 1902-1970, in National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease: Intramural Contributions, 1887-1997, at 61 (H.R. 
Greenwald & V.A. Harden eds., 1987). 
RUCKER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/26/2014  7:04 PM 
114 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 18:1 
 
A.  The Biologic Control Act of 1902 
In 1902, Congress passed the Biologic Control Act in response to tetanus 
contamination of smallpox vaccines and diphtheria antitoxin that killed many 
people.22  The 1902 Act enabled the federal government to exert jurisdiction 
over “viruses, therapeutic serums, toxins, antitoxins, or analogous products”, 
such as biologics, that were intended for the “prevention and cure of diseases 
of man.”23  These categories of biologics represented immunologic agents, and 
“Congress . . . select[ed] these . . . substances out of particular concern for 
immunologic, allergenic, and . . .  [possible] contagious side effects.”24 
The 1902 Act also gave the federal government the power to monitor the 
production, labeling, and interstate traffic of biologics.25  However, the Act did 
not allow the government to regulate biologic products directly.26  Instead, 
regulatory powers were granted to the Hygienic Laboratory, which is the 
precursor to the National Institutes of Health (NIH).27 
In addition, the 1902 Act set groundbreaking precedents in the U.S. by 
modifying common law notions of punishment for intentional and reckless 
conduct, by instead favoring “pro-active safety measures” for entities, and by 
 
22. Id. at 147; Biologics Control Act of 1902 Pub. L. No. 57–244. ch. 1378, 32 Stat. 728 (July 
1, 1902) (“An Act To regulate the sale of viruses, serums, toxins, and analogous products in the District 
of Columbia; to regulate interstate traffic in said articles, and for other purposes.”). 
23. Biologics Control Act of 1902 ch. 1378. 
24. See Dudzinski, supra note 15, at 147. Immunologic Agents, DRUGS.COM, 
http://www.drugs.com/drug-class/immunologic-agents.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (“Immunologic 
agents are drugs that can modify the immune response, either by enhancing or suppressing the immune 
system.  They are used to fight infections, prevent and treat certain diseases.  Immunologic agents 
include drugs used for immunosuppression to prevent graft rejection.  They can be used as cancer 
chemotherapy agents.  Some immunologic agents can down-regulate the inflammatory process and 
can be used to treat inflammatory conditions such as rheumatoid arthritis, autoimmune conditions and 
so on.”). 
25. Biologics Control Act of 1902 ch. 1378. 
26. See Dudzinski, supra note 15, at 148. 
27. Id.  A Short History of the National Institutes of Health: The Move to Washington, OFFICE 
OF NIH HISTORY, http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_02.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) 
(“In 1901, the [Hygienic] [L]aboratory was . . . [created] when Congress authorized $35,000 for 
construction of a new building in which the laboratory could investigate ‘infectious and contagious 
diseases and matters pertaining to the public health.’”); A Short History of the National Institutes of 
Health: Biologics, OFFICE OF NIH HISTORY, http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_03.html 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (“The Biologics Control Act was a second piece of legislation enacted in 
1902 that had major consequences for the Hygienic Laboratory.  It charged the laboratory with 
regulating the production of vaccines and antitoxins, thus making it a regulatory agency four years 
before passage of the better-known 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act."); About NIH, OFFICE OF NIH 
http://www.nih.gov/about/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (“The National Institutes of Health [is] a part of 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [and is] the nation’s medical research agency—
making important discoveries that improve health and save lives.”). 
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also becoming the first “premarket approval statute.”28  Therefore, companies 
wishing to market biological products needed their manufacturing facilities to 
pass federal inspection before they could market their drugs to the public.29 
B.  The Pure Food and Drug Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act 
Four years after the Biologics Act of 1902, Congress enacted the Pure Food 
and Drug Act (PFDA) to prevent the adulteration and misbranding of food and 
drugs.30  However, the PFDA “did not include any controls over manufacturing 
establishments, unlike the pre-existing Biologics Act.”31  As a result, there was 
no form of premarket control over new drugs to ensure their safety before 
entering the market.32 
To alleviate the problem, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).33  The law gave the federal government power to 
regulate food, drugs, medical devices, and the entities that manufactured and 
distributed such products.34  It also “required [manufacturers] to submit 
evidence of a new drug’s safety to the government in a premarket new drug 
application (NDA)” before the manufacturers could sell the drug.35  
Furthermore, the FDCA broadened laws regarding adulteration, and added 
“drugs or medical devices that were contaminated, manufactured, or held in 
conditions under which such product might become contaminated or 
degraded.”36 
C.  The Public Health Service Act 
Several years after the FDCA’s enactment, the Public Health Service Act 
(PHSA) was approved by Congress to control the manufacturing process of 
 
28. See Dudzinski, supra note 15, at 147. 
29. Id. 
30. Pure Food & Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59–384, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (“An Act for 
preventing the manufacture, sale, or transportation of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or 
deleterious foods, drugs, medicines, and liquors, and for regulating traffic therein, and for other 
purposes.”) (repealed 1938). 
31. Gary E. Gamerman, Regulation of Biologics Manufacturing: Questioning the Premise, 49 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213, 218 (1994). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 218–19; Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(1938). 
34. Gamerman, supra note 31, at 218. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 218–19. 
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biologics.37  In addition, the Biologics Act was also reenacted.38  However, 
Congress altered the biologics statute by adding mandatory product licensure 
and specific criteria for issuing license approvals of biologics.39  Under the 
revised statute, licenses for both establishments and products had to meet 
standards “designed to insure [sic] the continued safety, purity, and potency of 
such products, prescribed in regulation.”40  This revision to the Biologics Act 
aligned biologic regulation with drug regulation under the FDCA.41 
D.  Natural Source Biological Products and the Hatch-Waxman Act 
In general, biological products are regulated under the PHSA, and chemical 
drugs are regulated under the FDCA.42  However, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) has been given authority to regulate certain natural 
source biological products.43  For example, Congress granted the FDA authority 
to market insulin.44  This authorization is important because the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly referred to 
as the “Hatch-Waxman Act”), “provides a mechanism for the approval of 
generic drugs under the [FDCA], but not under the [PHSA].”45 
Therefore, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer can enjoy 
an abbreviated approval process for a drug, by relying on the safety and 
effectiveness of clinical-trial data produced by a reference-product sponsor’s 
(RPS) already approved drug application.46  So long as the generic 
manufacturer shows that its drug has ‘the same’ active ingredient as the 
reference drug and is also bioequivalent to the reference drug, it will acquire 
FDA approval.47 
 
37. Id. at 219; Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78–410, § 351, 58 Stat. 682, 702 (1944) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262). This is in contrast to drug and medical device regulation under the 
FDCA, which focused on ensuring safety and effectiveness of the final product, with control of the 
manufacturing process being only of secondary concern. 
38. Gamerman, supra note 31 at 219. 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012). 
40. Gamerman, supra note 31 at 219. 
41. Id. 
42. Judith A. Johnson, FDA Regulation of Follow-On Biologics, CONG. RES. SERV. (2010), 
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34045_20090224.pdf. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. (“In the 1940s, insulin was obtained in the same manner as many biologics, namely 
extraction from animals.  Despite this similarity with biologics, insulin was regulated by the FDA.”  
This also applied to a small set of hormones including: “glucagon, human growth hormone, hormones 
to treat infertility, hormones used to manage menopause and osteoporosis, and certain medical 
enzymes (hyaluronidase and urokinase).”). Id. at 6–7. 
45. Id. at 7; see 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). 
46. Johnson, supra note 42. 
47. Id. at 7. 
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However, this abbreviated process was not made available to biologics.48  
Congress concluded that biologic proteins were too large and complex, and the 
utilization of biological material in the manufacturing process would be too 
difficult to characterize and accurately copy the reference biologic consistently 
enough to reproduce the desired product.49  Even the smallest alteration to a 
biologic or the manufacturing process could completely differentiate a biologic 
from its reference product, and have an effect on the biologic’s safety and 
effectiveness.50  These differences could be difficult to detect.51  Therefore, 
Congress excluded biologics from the abbreviated approval process, until 
recently.52 
E.  The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) 
In 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA) into law.53  The legislation amends the PHSA by creating 
an abbreviated pathway for biological products that are shown to be 
“biosimilar” to or “interchangeable” with an FDA-licensed biological 
product.54  The pathway is detailed in the PPACA under the BCPIA section.55 
Under the BPCIA, a RPS applicant must show that the biological product 
is “safe, pure, and potent” and that “the facility in which the biological product 
is manufactured, processed, packed, or held meets standards designed to assure 
that the biological product continues to be safe, pure, and potent.”56  Upon 
approval of a reference product, the sponsor is granted four years of data 
exclusivity and twelve years of market exclusivity, if the biologic product was 
not previously licensed.57 
 
48. Id. 
49. See id. 
50. Id. at 10. 
51. Kate S. Gaudry, Exclusivity Strategies and Opportunities in View of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 587, 589 (2011) (“Consequences of seemingly 
minor structural deviations may include, for example, aggregation and incorrect folding and structural 
anomalies, such as truncation, proteolysis and amino-acid modifications.  Each of these results may 
have an effect on a product’s effectiveness and safety.  Additionally, due to the large size of biologics, 
there is a sizable risk that the immune system will attack the agent, causing adverse side effects.”). 
52. Johnson, supra note 42. 
53. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–48, 124 Stat. 119 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
54. How Drugs are Developed and Approved, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/Biosimilars/default.htm ((last visited Mar. 
17, 2013).b 
55. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, §§ 7001–7003. 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(1)(C) (2010). 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A). 
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Data exclusivity prevents a “follow-on-biologic (FOB) applicant”58 from 
filing for a biosimilar license on an identical or similar drug using the RPS’s 
data.59  Therefore, a FOB applicant can only file an application four years after 
the reference product is licensed.60  If the FOB applicant wishes to get earlier 
approval, it must gather its own data by conducting independent research and 
clinical trials.61 
In addition, the BPCIA creates an abbreviated application process for FOB 
applicants.62  Unless the FDA determines that the process is unnecessary, “the 
applicant must submit information demonstrating that the FOB and reference 
product: (1) are biosimilar; (2) use the same mechanism of action for the 
applicable condition to the extent that the reference product’s mechanism is 
known; and (3) share the same conditions of use, route of administration, 
dosage form, and strength.”63  Furthermore, the “facility in which the biologic 
is manufactured, processed, packed, or held must meet the standards designed 
to ensure that the biologic continues to be safe, pure, and potent.”64 
III.  THE OLD AND NEW PATENT PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO THE BPCIA 
The basis of the United States patent system is derived from the Article I, 
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress the power to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”65  Based on this power, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 
1790,66  which rewarded a patent to anyone who was the “first and true inventor 
or discoverer” of a particular invention.67 
Three years later, Congress passed additional legislation68 that provided for 
binding arbitration “in case[s] of interfering applications” for a patent.69  The 
procedure enabled an infringer to invalidate a patentee’s patent if the infringer 
could prove that the patentee was not the first inventor of the invention.70 
 
58. Also known as a generic biologic manufacturer applying for a drug license.  
59. Gaudry, supra note 51, at 592. 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B). 
61. Gaudry, supra note 51, at 592. 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2). 
63. Gaudry, supra note 51, at 597; 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2). 
64. Gaudry, supra note 51, at 597; 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2). 
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
66. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793). 
67. Id. 
68. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836). 
69. 3A–10 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.02(1) (2012). 
70. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836). The 1793 Patent Act contained 
similar provision to the 1790 Act, but used “true inventor” rather than “first and true inventor.”  
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Decades later, the legislature passed the Patent Act of 1836, which created 
the United States Patent Office (USPTO) and the patent examination system.71  
More importantly, the 1836 Act established the first-to-invent filing system, 
which continues to determine the priority date of invention for patent claims 
filed before March 16, 2013.72 
A.  The First-To-Invent Filing System Under the Patent Act of 1952 
In 1893, Judge Taft stated the first-to-invent rule, which became the filing 
framework used under the Patent Act of 1952.73  He held that 
the man who first reduces an invention to practice is prima facie the 
first and true inventor, but . . . the man who first conceives, and, in a 
mental sense, first invents . . . may date his patentable invention back 
to the time of its conception, if he connects the conception with its 
reduction to practice by reasonable diligence on his part.74 
One way to show reduction to practice was by filing a patent application.75  
The Patent Act of 1952 stated that the first person to invent or conceive the 
invention, even if he was not the first person to file, would be granted a patent 
so long as he could show diligence in filing his application or otherwise 
reducing the invention to practice.76 
Although the general rule granted patent protection to the first inventor, the 
“public use statutory bar” in the 1952 Act was used as a safeguard to ensure 
that the first inventor disclosed his invention to the public in a timely fashion.77  
Under this statutory bar, public use occurred “when the inventor allow[ed] 
another person to use the invention without limitation, restriction or obligation 
of secrecy to the inventor.”78  If the inventor wished to receive patent protection, 
 
Chisum, supra note 69 § 10.02(1).  
71. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117. 
72. Chisum, supra note 69, § 10.02(2)(b); AIA 2011.  The invention date for patent claims filed 
before March 16, 2013 will continue to be analyzed under § 102 and § 103 of the Patent Act of 1952.  
Id. § 10.10. 
73. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (1997); See id. § 102(g) (2006).  
74. Christie v. Seybold, 55 F. 69, 76 (6th Cir. 1893); see also Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 1, 34 (1943) (“It is well established that as between two inventors priority of 
invention will be awarded to the one who by satisfying proof can show that he first conceived the 
invention.”). 
75. See Chisum, supra note 69, § 10.03(1). 
76. See 35 U.S.C § 102(g).  
77. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
78. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2133.03(a) (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 2013) (citing In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 
1134 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
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he had to file a patent application within one year of such public use.79  This 
rule was designed to avoid two problems in the first-to-invent system.80 
First, it stopped inventors from waiting for others to independently create 
the invention, so that they could assert priority over the independently created 
invention, and demand profits accrued by the independent inventors.81  Second, 
the statutory bar prevented inventors “from bringing a product to market, 
starting to profit from the invention, and then waiting to file for a patent until 
many years later when competition [arose], thereby depriving the public of the 
full knowledge of the invention and preventing improvements in the 
invention.”82  Thus, the statutory bar kept inventors from acquiring a market 
monopoly past the time limit granted by Congress and ensured timely public 
disclosure of their inventions.83 
B.  The-First-To-File System Under the AIA 
Under the AIA, the first-to-invent framework has been replaced by the new 
standard called the “first inventor to file” system.84  The AIA filing framework 
is often characterized as “a race to the patent office” because the inventor who 
files a patent application first is granted a patent even if another independent 
inventor of the same invention was the first to conceive and/or create the 
invention.85  In addition, “prior art” language has been broadened to deny 
patentability to an invention if it has been “patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before 
the effective filing date of the claimed invention.”86 
The filing rule also grants inventors a grace period under the new 35 U.S.C 
§ 102(b)(1)(B).87  Under this section, an inventor who publicly discloses the 
nature of his invention less than a year before filing an application to the 
USPTO will not have his invention classified as prior art for the purposes of his 
 
79. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
80. Suzanne Konrad, The United States First-to-Invent System: Economic Justifications for 
Maintaining the Status Quo, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1629, 1636 (2007). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. AIA 2011 § 3; Chisum, supra note 69, § 10.10 (On March 16, 2013, the filing system 
“shift[ed] from the long-standing first to invent priority principle to a “first inventor to file" priority 
principle.  The Act amend[s] Section 102 and Section 103 to remove references to invention dates, 
including Section 102(g).  The changes to Sections 102 and 103 are effective for patent claims entitled 
to effective filing dates after March 15, 2013.”). 
85. Wendell Ray Guffey & Kimberly Schreiber, America Invents Act: The Switch to A First-
to-File Patent System, 68 J. MO. B. 156 (2012). 
86. AIA 2011 §§ 102(b)(1), 102(a)(1). 
87. AIA 2011 §§ 3(b)(1), 102(b)(1). 
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application; however, it will count as prior art for other independent applicants 
attempting to patent their inventions.88 
C.  Provisional Patents 
Provisional patents under the AIA are a way to initiate the patent process at 
a lower filing cost and also align the U.S patent system more closely to the 
international patent framework.89  These patents are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 
111(b), which states that a provisional application must include a 
specification90 and a drawing91 if necessary to understand the invention.92 
A provisional patent provides the examiner with an approximate date that 
a patent applicant conceived and constructively reduced an invention to 
practice.93  These patents are not closely examined by the USPTO, and are 
typically used by a patent applicant to extend the patent approval process.94  At 
the applicant’s discretion, the inventor can file a corresponding non-provisional 
application within twelve months of the provisional application’s filing date.95 
The non-provisional application will be substantively examined by the 
USPTO,96 and so long as the invention claimed in the non-provisional 
application is adequately supported by the disclosure in the provisional patent, 
the applicant will be able to claim the benefit of the provisional patent’s filing 
date, thus backdating the patent application by up to twelve months.97  In other 
words, when the USPTO examiner compares the claims of the non-provisional 
application with prior art for purposes of assessing novelty and non-
obviousness, the examiner will only consider prior art with an effective filing 
date earlier than the filing date of the provisional patent.98 
 
88. AIA 2011 §102(b)(1)(B); see also 1–SA02 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 
3. 
89. H. Roy Berkenstock, The Provisional Application for Patent: Its Place in Intellectual 
Property Protection, 24 THE COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER 6, 14 (2006). 
90. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
91. 35 U.S.C. § 113. 
92. AIA 2011 § 111(b). 
93. See Charles E. Van Horn, Practicalities and Potential Pitfalls When Using Provisional 
Patent Applications, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 259, 299 (1994).  In addition, a provisional patent can establish 
the filing date for foreign patent applications under the “Patent Cooperation Treaty”, which is an area 
of law that this comment does not examine.  See Patent Cooperation Treaty, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/a11.htm#_11. 
94. Horn, supra note 93 at 291. 
95. 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(c)(3)(ii). 
96. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a). 
97. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1).  For an example of an unsuccessful attempt to claim during 
litigation the benefit of a provisional application’s filing date in order to avoid a 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
statutory bar, see New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
98. See 35 U.S.C § 119(e)(1). 
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Furthermore, when the patent examiner determines that the claims in 
question are adequately supported by the disclosure of the provisional patent99 
and the applicant decides to claim the benefit of his provisional filing date, the 
examiner will treat the provisional application date in one of two ways: (1) as 
the applicant’s invention date under the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 102,100 
or (2) the effective filing date for an application filed on or after March 16, 
2013 (post-AIA).101  In either situation, if another individual files for a U.S. 
patent on the same or similar invention, or publishes information on the 
invention, such material will not be considered prior art against the inventor’s 
non-provisional application, and the patent examiner will ignore such prior art 
when determining patentability of the invention.102 
D.  The Disclosure Requirement 
“To obtain a valid patent claiming a new, useful, and nonobvious product 
or process, the inventor must file with his or her application a specification fully 
disclosing the invention and how to make and use it.”103  Under 35 U.S.C. § 
112 ¶ 1, the inventor “must adequately set forth and describe three items: (1) 
the invention (the [adequate written] description requirement); (2) the manner 
and process of making and using the invention (the enablement requirement); 
and (3) the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his 
invention (the best mode requirement).”104  For the purposes of this Article, 
only the adequate written description requirement and enablement requirement 
 
99. The claims are adequately supported when the specification of the provisional contains a 
written description of the invention and the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms, 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), to enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to practice 
the invention claimed in the nonprovisional application.  UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 201.11.I.A  (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 
2013). 
100. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (The invention date for the purposes of analyzing novelty, loss of 
right, and non-obviousness); UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §201.11.I.A (8th ed., Aug. 2001) (stating that “[i]f the filing date of 
the earlier provisional application is necessary, for example, in the case of an interference or to 
overcome a reference, care must be taken to ensure that the disclosure filed as the provisional 
application adequately provides (1) a written description of the subject matter of the claim(s) at issue 
in the later filed nonprovisional application, and (2) an enabling disclosure to permit one of ordinary 
skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention in the later filed nonprovisional application 
without undue experimentation.”). 
101. See AIA 2011 § 100(i)(1)(B) (the filing date of the earliest application for which the . . . 
application is entitled, as to such invention, to a right of priority under section 119 . . . .”); AIA 2011 
§ 119(e)(1) (domestic priority).  
102. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 201.11.I.A  (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 2013). 
103. Chisum, supra note 69, § 7.01. 
104. Chisum, supra note 69, § 7.01. 
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are examined. 
The written description requirement is designed to ensure that the inventor 
had possession of the claimed subject-matter upon submission of the original 
application.105  The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states that 
[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make 
and use the same . . . . 106 
Therefore, in order to “satisfy the written description requirement, the 
specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail, so that 
one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession 
of the claimed invention.”107  In other words, “the specification must describe 
the claimed invention in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill 
in the art and show that the inventor actually invented the claimed invention.”108 
Additionally, the claims in the application must also satisfy the written 
description requirement: including “original claims that are part of the 
disclosure as filed.”109  While many of these original claims will satisfy the 
written description requirement, some will not.110 
For example, patent applications that describe claims with generic language 
in the original disclosure can fail to satisfy the requirement when they do not 
support the scope of the genus claimed.111  A claim can also fail the written 
 
105. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2163–2163.04 (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 2013); In re Herschler, 
591 F.2d 693, 700–01 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
106. AIA 2011 § 112 (emphasis added). 
107. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2161.01 (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 2013) (emphasis added) (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. 
v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
108. Id. 
109. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2161.01 (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 2013) (citing Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)). 
110. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349; see also LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 
1336, 1343–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
111. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2161.01 (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 2013) (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350); Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that generic claim 
language appearing in ipsis verbis in the original specification did not satisfy the written description 
requirement because it failed to support the scope of the genus claimed.); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 
1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that “only similar language in the specification or 
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description requirement when the original claim describes the invention in 
functional language, but the specification does not provide adequate 
instructions on how to produce the claimed function.112 
Furthermore, satisfying the written description requirement can be 
challenging in situations where a patent applicant writes a genus claim that uses 
functional language to define the boundaries of a claimed genus.113  In such 
instances, the functional claims may assert a desired result but fail to adequately 
describe the species that achieved that result.114  Therefore, the written 
description requirement in such situations is only met when, “the specification 
[has] demonstrate[d] that the applicant has made a generic invention that 
achieves the claimed result and . . .  show[s] that the applicant has invented 
species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-defined genus.”115 
The enablement requirement, on the other hand, calls for the inventor to set 
forth in the patent specification sufficient information to enable a person skilled 
in the relevant art to make and use the invention.116  “The invention that one 
skilled in the art must be enabled to make and use is that defined by the claim(s) 
of the particular application or patent.”117  The purpose of such a requirement 
is to ensure that invention is communicated to the interested public in a 
meaningful way.118  The information contained in the disclosure of an 
application “must be sufficient to inform those skilled in the relevant art how 
to both make and use the claimed invention.”119  However, to comply with 35 
U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1, it is not necessary to “enable one of ordinary skill in the art 
to make and use a perfected, commercially viable embodiment absent a claim 
limitation to that effect.”120  “Detailed procedures for making and using the 
invention [are not always] necessary if the description of the invention itself is 
sufficient to permit those skilled in the art to make and use the invention.”121  
However, although an applicant in most circumstances is not required to reduce 
 
original claims is necessary to satisfy the written description requirement.”)). 
112. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349 (“[A]n adequate written description of a claimed genus requires 
more than a generic statement of an invention’s boundaries.”) (citing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568). 
113. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349. 
114. Id. 
115. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2161.01 (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 2013) (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349). 
116. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2164 (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 2013); see also Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark 
Corp., 216 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Chisum, supra note 69). 
117. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2164. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. (citing CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
121. Id. 
RUCKER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/26/2014  7:04 PM 
2014]THE NEW ERA OF BIOLOGIC REGULATION AND PATENTING 125 
 
the invention to practice prior to filing an application, the presence or absence 
of examples in the patent specification may be a factor in determining the extent 
to which claims involving unpredictable technology—such as biotechnology—
are enabled.122 
It is important to note that the enablement requirement is separate and 
distinct from the adequate written description requirement.123  As the USPTO 
explains: 
[T]he fact than an additional limitation to a claim may lack descriptive 
support in the disclosure as originally filed does not necessarily mean 
that the limitation is also not enabled. In other words, the statement of 
a new limitation in and of itself may enable one skilled in the art to 
make and use the claim containing that limitation even though that 
limitation may not be described in the original disclosure. 
Consequently, such limitations must be analyzed for both enablement 
and [adequate written] description using their separate and distinct 
criteria.124 
IV.  THE ROLE OF MARKET EXCLUSIVITY IN PATENTS 
Market exclusivity confers patent-like protection to an individual’s product 
against competitors.125  It is best understood as “an economic measure designed 
to promote costly investments in innovation . . . .”126  Typically, such regulation 
prevents, for a specified period of time, another pharmaceutical applicant 
(commonly referred to as the “second entrant”) “from obtaining a marketing 
authorization for its drug . . . through a facilitated procedure . . . .”127  The 
procedure usually entails reliance by the second entrant on the preclinical and 
clinical data generated by the RPS when the second entrant submits that data in 
support of its own drug application.128  Therefore, the drug that the second 
applicant requests for marketing approval is identical or similar to the RPS’s 
drug, which makes the reference drug’s pre-clinical and clinical data relevant 
 
122. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
123. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563, (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[t]he purpose of the 
‘written description’ requirement is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make and use’ . . . . “). 
124. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2164 (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 2013). 
125. Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and European Union 
Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479 (2004). 
126. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How 
Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 483 (2003). 
127. Junod, supra note 125, at 479. 
128. Id. at 479–80. 
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to assess the second entrant’s application.129 
In most instances, market exclusivity prevents the second entrant from 
using the RPS’s data to evaluate its own application.130  As a result, the second 
entrant will only be able to obtain market approval “if it generates its own data 
supporting the safety and efficacy of its drug.”131  The process of generating 
this data can be extremely expensive, so second entrants usually wait for the 
expiration of the RPS’s exclusivity period to avoid this expense.132  Therefore, 
market entry, especially for generic manufacturers in the drug industry, is 
typically delayed until the market exclusivity period of the RPS expires.133 
A.  Market Exclusivity in the Biologic Industry 
In 1984, Congress provided for periods of marketing exclusivity in the 
pharmaceutical industry ranging from four to seven and a half years under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.134  In 2010, the biopharmaceutical industry persuaded 
Congress to confer twelve years of marketing exclusivity before “the FDA can 
approve products that are biosimilar to previously approved biological 
products.”135 
Under this regulatory scheme, an application for a biosimilar license may 
not be filed for four years (data exclusivity), and its approval may not be made 
effective for twelve years (market exclusivity), after the licensing of the 
reference product.136  Unlike the Hatch-Waxman Act, however, there is no 
provision for the FDA to stay regulatory approval of a biosimilar license 
pending resolution of litigation between two opposing parties.137 
In addition, modification to the structure of a biological product that results 
in a change to safety, purity, or potency, is granted its own twelve-year period 
of market exclusivity under the BPCIA.138  An extra six months of “pediatric 
exclusivity” to both the four-year data exclusivity, and to the twelve-year 
market exclusivity before a license may become effective is also available 
 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 480. 
132. Id.  
133. Id. 
134. Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); REBECCA S. EISENBERG, THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 188 (Patricia M. Danzon & 
Sean Nicholson eds. 2012). 
135. Eisenberg, supra note 134; The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 
signed into law as Title VII, Subtitle A, §§ 7001–03 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148 (H.R. 3590) (2010). 
136. Eisenberg, supra note 134, at 189; 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(7)(A)–(B) (2010). 
137. Eisenberg, supra note 134; see 42 U.S.C. § 262(l). 
138. Eisenberg, supra note 134, at 190; 42 U.S.C §§ 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(I)–(II). 
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under the conditions applicable to pediatric exclusivity for biologic drugs.139 
B.  The Defense for Market Exclusivity 
Proponents of biopharmaceutical market exclusivity believe the regulation 
is necessary for a number of reasons.  For instance, the cost of developing new 
specialty drugs (including those that fail testing) is typically around $1.2 
billion.140  Furthermore, the average preclinical and clinical development of a 
drug can take over ten years.141  Without market protection, a biomedical 
company faces potential generic competition caused by delayed regulatory 
approval of its own drug.142  This places the RPS at risk of losing profits, or 
even worse, failing to recover revenue from R&D of the product.  A 
competitor’s ability to file an abbreviated biologic application, based on the 
RPS’s own clinical data, reduces a competitor’s own R&D costs, which enable 
it to sell the generic drug at a significantly reduced price. 143 
To address this unsatisfactory situation, biopharmaceutical companies 
argue that marketing exclusivity is necessary to promote incentives for 
innovation in the field.144  Without such exclusivity, pharmaceutical companies 
will be less inclined to research both innovative and less cutting-edge areas of 
biomedical treatment because of the inability to predict whether early 
investments will lead to strong and valid patents that produce profits.145 
Biopharmaceutical companies also argue that marketing exclusivity is 
necessary to encourage innovation because brand-name companies can have 
their patents invalidated even though their drugs are innovative.146  For 
example, a patent may be denied or invalidated because the inventor published 
his research prior to filing a patent application.147  Marketing exclusivity 
mitigates this risk because once exclusivity is granted it offers strong product 
protection.148 
Last of all, biomedical companies believe “the scope of regulatory 
exclusivity . . . corresponds better to relevant product markets than do patents.  
Regulatory exclusivity tracks the terms of regulatory product approvals, while 
 
139. Id.; 42 U.S.C § 262(m). 
140. Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, Follow-On Biologics: The Law and Intellectual 
Property Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41483.pdf. 
141. See Junod, supra note 125, at 481. 
142. Id. at 482. 
143. Id. at 481. 
144. Id. at 482. 
145. See id. at 483. 
146. Id. at 484. 
147. Id.; see generally 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
148. Junod, supra note 125, at 484. 
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patent claims, drafted to distinguish an invention from the prior art, may 
correspond less closely to any commercial product.”149 
V.  THE DANGER OF GRANTING MARKET EXCLUSIVITY FOR BIOLOGICS IN A 
FIRST-TO-INVENT SYSTEM AND THE NEED FOR MODIFICATION OF THE BPCIA 
A.  The Rise of the Biomedical Industry 
Due to technological limitations in the past, biotechnology has only 
recently become an important source of life-saving drugs.  As a result, 
biopharmaceuticals are a widely unexplored area of medicine that holds the 
potential for large-scale production of new innovative products. 
In the United States, companies have started to recognize this budding field 
and invest greatly into R&D to create new biological products.150  For instance, 
in 2008, R&D expenditures of biologics were at $30.4 billion, a significant 
increase from the $26.1 billion spent in 2007.151  These specialty drugs have 
become so popular that for several consecutive years, “biotech companies have 
secured more product approvals than their big pharma counterparts, even 
though big pharma significantly outspends the biotechnology industry on 
research and development[.]”152  In addition, patient spending on biomedical 
drugs, “which account for about a quarter of all prescription drug costs, 
increased by 18.4 percent in 2012 even as the cost of traditional drugs 
dropped.”153  These trends indicate that biotechnology is the pathway the drug 
industry will follow in the future. 
B.  Disincentives to Innovation in a Post-AIA Framework 
However, despite the huge increase in R&D of biologics, the AIA in 
conjunction with the BPCIA will create disincentives to the pioneering of 
innovative biological inventions in the biomedical field.  These disincentives 
are a result of the AIA filing system, which grants the “first-inventor-to-file” a 
patent, even if another independent inventor already created the invention.  As 
a result, competing inventors will be forced to file applications as early as 
possible to ensure patent protection of their products. 
 
149. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 194. 
150. Schacht, supra note 140, at 3. 
151. Id. 
152. ERNST & YOUNG, BEYOND BORDERS: GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 1 (Guatam 
Jaggi ed., 2007). 
153. Thomas, supra note 7. 
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1.  Provisional Patent and Disclosure Disincentives 
In the case of biologics, provisional patents will be utilized to protect 
incomplete drug R&D due to the extremely competitive nature of the 
biomedical industry.  Drug companies require a substantial amount of capital 
to research and develop innovative products.154  To acquire such funds, these 
firms need financing from private investors.155  However, investors do not 
provide financing for R&D without some indication that a product will generate 
future profits.156  Therefore, patent protection on inventions is needed to 
encourage investors to provide capital to drug companies. 
The enablement requirement produces a number of issues that affect 
investor confidence.  For example, one problem is determining whether a 
specification that sets forth only “a single or a limited number of examples can 
be enabling of broad claims when the subject matter concerns biological 
materials or reactions, which are generally considered to be unpredictable.”157  
Both the USPTO and the Federal Circuit have often held that a small number 
of examples do not sufficiently enable an invention in such circumstances.158  
Due to increased pressure to file patent applications early,159 there is a greater 
risk of inventors submitting specifications that fail to meet the enabling 
requirement.  Although many of these patents will be approved of by the 
 
154. See ALEX M. BRILL, PROPER DURATION OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY FOR GENERIC 
BIOLOGICS: A CRITIQUE 6 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.tevadc.com/Brill_Exclusivity_in_
Biogenerics.pdf. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
157. See Chisum, supra note 69, § 7.03[4][d][i]. 
158. See Ex parte Forman, LEXIS 24, 4 (B.P.A.I. 1986) (noting that ultimate question is 
“whether or not the specification contains a sufficiently explicit disclosure to enable one having 
ordinary skill in the relevant field to practice the invention claimed therein without the exercise of 
undue experimentation.”); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the USPTO did 
not err in rejecting applicants’ generic claims to hybrid genes and transformed cells because “[t]here 
is no reasonable correlation between the narrow disclosure in [applicants’] specification and the broad 
scope of protection sought . . . .”); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that the 
USPTO did not err in rejecting applicant’s broad claims to pathogenic RNA virus vaccines because 
his specification gave only a single working example); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the USPTO did not err by rejecting applicant’s broad claims to a method for producing 
mammalian peptides in any plant cell when applicant’s specification gave only a single working 
example, which involved the dicotyledonous species, tobacco, and a gene coding for gamma-
interferon); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that 
“the breadth of enablement in the patent specifications is not commensurate in scope with the claims, 
as the quantity of experimentation required to practice antisense in cells other than E. coli at the filing 
date would have been undue.”); For more in-depth analysis of the aforementioned cases, see Chisum, 
supra note 69, § 7.03[4][d][i]. 
159. As explained previously in the article, the AIA filing rules encourage inventors to file for 
patent protection earlier than under the Patent Act of 1952 because protection is now granted on a first-
come-first served basis.  
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USPTO,160 investors will be less prone to funding biomedical ventures because 
the patents will be more vulnerable to successful enablement challenges by 
competitors, which will increase the risk that these biologic patents will be 
invalidated 
Another issue is whether a deposit of biological material is necessary.161  
Ordinarily, a deposit of biological material is not necessary if the specification 
provides sufficient guidance on how to produce the claimed invention from 
“publicly available source material.”162  The Federal Circuit has determined 
that: 
Where an invention depends on the use of living materials such as 
microorganisms or cultured cells, it may be impossible to enable the 
public to make the invention (i.e., to obtain these living materials) 
solely by means of a written [description].  One means that has been 
developed for complying with the enablement requirement is to deposit 
the living materials in cell depositories which will distribute samples to 
the public who wish to practice the invention after the patent issues. . . . 
A deposit has been held necessary for enablement where the starting 
materials (i.e., the living cells used to practice the invention, or cells 
from which the required cells can be produced) are not readily available 
to the public.  Even when starting materials are available, a deposit has 
been necessary where it would require undue experimentation to make 
the cells of the invention from the starting materials. . . . 
No deposit is necessary if the biological organisms can be obtained 
from readily available sources or derived from readily available starting 
materials through routine screening that does not require undue 
experimentation.163 
In practice, the USPTO Board has sometimes held that a deposit is not 
necessary because the written specification was sufficiently enabling.164  
 
160. See Ex parte Goeddel, LEXIS 3, 3 (B.P.A.I. 1985). 
161. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735–36 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
162. See Chisum, supra note 69, § 7.03[4][d][iii]; e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1011 (C.D. Calif. 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446, (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“the biological 
materials need not be deposited when the invention can be practiced without undue experimentation 
from biological materials available in prior art.”)(citation omitted); Compare J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. 
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001) (for a utility patent on a plant, “the 
plant must meet the specifications of § 112, which require a written description of the plant and a 
deposit of seed that is publicly accessible. See 37 CFR §§ 1.801–1.809 (2001).”). 
163. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 735–36 (footnote omitted). 
164. Flehmig v. Giesa, 13 USPQ 2d 1052, 1057 (B.P.A.I. 1989) (no deposit of the specific 
HAV strain (hepatitis A virus) used by the inventor is necessary when HAV is publicly available and 
the opposing party failed to show that HAV is strain specific); Ex parte Rinehart, 10 USPQ 2d 1719, 
1720 (B.P.A.I. 1989) (no deposit necessary; the claimed process involved, inter alia, extracting “a 
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However, there are also a number of cases that have ruled the other way.165 
The situation is also further exacerbated by the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of the written specification requirement.166  To satisfy the rule, “a 
[biologic] inventor is required to provide a comprehensive description of the 
compound for which patent protection is sought.”167  However, this can be 
particularly challenging for biologic inventors: 
[w]hile it may be fairly straightforward to provide a description of a 
single biologic molecule (i.e., a protein therapeutic or monoclonal 
antibody) and to provide initial studies showing efficacy for certain 
indications, it may take several years to explore what changes can be 
made to the molecule to improve or preserve function.168 
In addition, “characterizing the complete spectrum of diseases for which 
the biologic may have therapeutic benefits, developing a stable formulation, 
and developing large scale culture conditions may take several years.”169  As a 
result, licensing of follow-on biologics was not permitted until 2009 due to the 
technological complexity involved in creating biological products.170 
Furthermore, although technology in the field of biologics has improved 
over time, biological treatments still remain as a largely unexplored area of 
medicine.  Scientists have yet to identify most biological genera, or the 
accompanying species that comprise such groups.171  Therefore, knowledge of 
how such biological organisms function is limited, and without in-depth 
research and analysis, patents produced will be poorly constructed by failing to 
fully characterize and identify claims. 
 
suitable marine tunicate from the family Didemnidae with MeOH:toluene (3:1)”; “the source of the 
marine organisms necessary for practice of the invention is described in detail in the specification by 
reference to specific locations in the sea”; "The marine tunicate are a well known class of marine 
microorganisms having definitive characteristics . . . [The applicant] has described the phylum, 
subphylum, class, order and suborder as well as where the organisms are located and how they can be 
obtained. The marine microorganisms are neither new nor unique but are commonly known and 
generally available to the public without any undue experimentation.”). 
165. See e.g. Ex parte Jackson, 217 USPQ 804 (B.P.A.I. 1982). 
166. See generally, Ariad, 598 F.3d 1336. The case narrowed the scope of patent protection for 
claims that do not fully and completely characterize the invention. 
167. Decaire, supra note 9, at 1059. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Rachel Macdonald, Biologic copy-cat drug development is rising, bringing 
pharmaceutical companies together, MEDILL REP. CHI. (May 10, 2012), 
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=205418. 
171. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2161.01 (9th ed., Aug. 2012, last rev. Jan 2013) (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349). 
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Poorly constructed patents are problematic for a variety of reasons.  For 
example, patents with overly broad claims can pre-empt future research by 
enabling patent holders to refuse access to essential technology to follow-on 
inventors.172  This has been of particular concern with nascent technologies, 
such as genetic inventions.173 
Excessively broad patents can also encourage undesired behavior by patent 
holders, “who [can] use their titles to appropriate revenue from existing 
inventions marketed by other companies.”174  This can result in “a broad patent 
on a basic invention with no substitutes [that] may be equivalent to having an 
exclusive right of exploitation over an essential facility, allowing its holder to 
bar follow-on inventors who would be willing to invest in R&D to create 
socially useful applications.”175  In addition, broad patents have a tendency to 
confer wide-ranging protection, especially in new areas.176  This protection can 
grant the patent holder more coverage than what they actually invented or 
discovered.177 
Narrowly constructed patents are also problematic.  For example, such 
patents can discourage research that promotes follow-on inventions.178  
“[E]xcessively weak and narrow patents [can also] deter business investment 
in R&D, as it becomes too easy for an imitator to undercut the inventor’s market 
price.”179  Furthermore, narrow patents can encourage “secrecy at the expense 
of publicity, and harm markets for technology, [thus preventing] diffusion of 
technology.”180 
In the context of biologics, poorly constructed patents will become more 
prevalent because of disincentives created by the new AIA’s filing rules, and 
disclosure requirements.  The new framework will complicate matters by 
forcing inventors to race to the patent office and by also broadening the 
language of what constitutes as prior art.181  As a result, biopharmaceutical 
companies will have no choice but to file for patent protection early, or else 
 
172. Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges,  supra note 12. 
173. See generally, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom.; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 
(U.S. 2013) (opinion vacated, appeal reinstated), 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
174. Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges, supra note 12, at 10. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 18. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 10. For more information on how narrow patents can hinder follow-on inventions, 
please read Judge Bryson’s dissent in Molecular Pathology.  
179. Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges, supra note 12, at 10. 
180. Id. 
181. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), with AIA 2011 § 102(b). 
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face possible pre-emption.  Without adequate time to fully characterize and 
identify their biological inventions, biomedical companies will produce more 
poorly constructed patents. 
2.  Market Exclusivity Disincentives 
Another threat to innovation is the grant of market exclusivity to patent 
invalidated products.  While such regulation can provide an addition layer of 
protection for inventors to encourage costly investments in innovation, it does 
not always do so.182 
Under the BPCIA, market exclusivity hinders innovation by providing 
biopharmaceutical companies with a safety net in case their patents are 
invalidated.  Competitors in such situations are denied the right to market the 
first-entrant’s product, even though the biologic is no longer patent protected.  
As a result, first-entrant companies are being granted product monopolies even 
though their drugs are not considered innovative. 
This marketing behavior will become more prevalent under the AIA’s filing 
rules, which encourage applicants to file applications early, or risk pre-
emption.183  As a result, biomedical companies will be forced to file 
applications prematurely, producing more poorly constructed patents that are 
vulnerable to validity challenges.184 
Biopharmaceutical companies may argue that market regulation is 
necessary to finance research into innovative biomedical inventions; however, 
the pharmaceutical industry’s history contradicts this assertion, as shown by the 
fact that patents have been the main driving factor in encouraging private 
investments into drug R&D.185 
C.  Solutions to Protect Innovation in the Biologic Field 
There are two viable ways to safeguard innovation in the biologic field: (1) 
by modifying the BPCIA so that market exclusivity is withdrawn upon 
invalidation of a biological patent, or (2) denying biological inventors the 
ability to file for provisional patents. 
1.  The Withdrawal of Market Exclusivity Upon Patent Invalidation 
Some scholars have discussed the risks involved with withdrawing market 
 
182. Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 487. 
183. AIA 2011 § 102. 
184. Biologics are still a widely unexplored field.  Biomedical competition reduces the amount 
of time companies have to conduct R&D on prospective products because of competition in the field.  
Therefore, the claims in patent applications will not fully characterize and identify such biologics.  As 
a result, patent applications that are approved will likely have claims that are overly broad/narrow. 
185. Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 480. 
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exclusivity from biologic products that are patent invalidated.  For example, 
Valerie Junod, a prominent pharmaceutical attorney from Geneva, has found 
that denying market exclusivity to non-innovative/un-patentable research 
outcomes may discourage firms from investing in biologic R&D.186  She argues 
that marketing exclusivity may be necessary to encourage innovation because 
brand-name companies may lose their patents even though their drugs are 
innovative.187  While these arguments may have held weight under the Patent 
Act of 1952, they no longer apply under the AIA. 
Currently, R&D expenditures on biologics are estimated around $30.4 
billion.188  In fact, data indicates that investments are increasing annually and 
that biotech companies are securing more product approvals for drugs than their 
pharmaceutical counterparts.189  Therefore, denying market exclusivity to 
invalidated biologic patents will not deter innovation.  Instead, it will encourage 
biomedical innovation by forcing inventors to carefully research and 
characterize claimed inventions before filing applications, or else risk losing 
market protection due to later patent invalidation.  As a result, withdrawing 
market exclusivity from patent-invalidated products will protect the original 
legislative intent of the BPCIA. 
2.  The Removal of Provisional Patents from Biologic Patent Applications 
Another viable way to safeguard innovation in the field is to deny biologic 
inventors the ability to file for provisional patents.  Under the AIA, the filing 
guidelines encourage inventors to file patent applications swiftly, or risk pre-
emption by a competitor’s own filing.  Provisional patents are a popular way to 
mitigate such risks, and provide benefits such as lower filing cost, the ability to 
extend the patent approval process, and the ability to pre-empt other 
inventors.190  As a result, provisional applications will become more prevalent 
under the AIA. 
However, in the biologic field the new filing rules pose significant risks to 
biomedical innovation because biologics “are complex mixtures that are not 
easily identified or characterized.”191  Biopharmaceutical companies compete 
 
186. Junod, supra note 125, at 482. 
187. Id. It should be noted that Junod’s article is really a criticism on market exclusivity. In the 
paper, she highlights what she believes to be legitimate arguments in favor of market exclusivity. 
188. Lynne Taylor, Big Biotech Growth “Outpacing Big Pharma”, PHARMATIMES (April 19, 
2013) http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/13-04-19/Big_Biotech_growth_%E2%80%259
Coutpacing_Big_Pharma%E2%80%9D.aspx (“Revenue growth for Big Biotech grew 40.6% to $48.6 
billion at the end of 2012, from $34.3 billion three years before, compared to an increase of 17% for 
Big Pharma, whoses [sic] revenue rose to $526.8 billion from $450.1 billion during the same period.”). 
189. Junod, supra note 125, at 482.  
190. AIA 2011 § 111(b). 
191. What are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, supra note 4. 
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in a high-risk, high reward environment, where the first firm to acquire a patent 
on a product typically reaps the benefits.  Therefore, these companies already 
face significant pressure to file patents early.  The AIA further exacerbates the 
problem by imposing stricter filing guidelines that only grant patents on a first-
come-first-serve basis.192  Thus, inventing and/or conceiving an invention is no 
longer enough to ensure patent protection. 
As a result of the AIA, biopharmaceutical companies will be forced to file 
for patent protection earlier.  Biomedical competition will reduce the time 
companies have to conduct R&D on prospective inventions, and will force 
applicants to file applications that fail to fully identify and characterize the 
biologics.  Therefore, applications that are approved, and eventually granted 
full patent coverage, will provide overly broad/narrow patent protection to non-
innovative inventions. 
However, modifying the BPCIA so that inventors can no longer acquire 
provisional patents will solve this issue.  Biomedical firms rely on investors to 
acquire funding for R&D.  Removing provisional patents as an option will 
encourage biotechnology companies to spend more time conducting R&D on 
their prospective inventions, thus increasing the number of innovative 
biological patents that fully characterize and identify the biologics.  As a result, 
these patents will be less susceptible to validity challenges, and investors will 
feel more confident about providing capital to such businesses.  Such 
predictability is an important factor that venture capitalists look at when 
deciding whether to invest in a business.193 
In addition, removing provisional patents from the table will also reduce 
the amount of litigation in the biotechnology field.  Without the ability to file 
provisional patents, biomedical companies will be encouraged to conduct 
extensive R&D to ensure that the USPTO approves their patent applications.  
Therefore, biologic patents that are approved will provide detailed 
specifications, which will discourage competing biologic firms from 
challenging the validity of innovator companies’ patents. 
The last benefit this proposal has, is that it will lessen the number of overly 
broad/narrow biologic patents the USPTO approves.  Patents in the biomedical 
field tend to claim subject matter in broad terms because of uncertainty in the 
field.194  As a result, biologic firms are granted protection over subject matter 
 
192. AIA 2011 § 102. 
193. To Get Venture Capital Funding Know the Risks and Tell a Good Story, FORBES (March 
2, 2012) http://www.forbes.com/sites/knowledgewharton/2012/03/02/to-get-venture-capital-funding-
know-the-risks-and-tell-a-good-story/. 
194. See Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing § 2215 (WRITTEN 
DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT; NO WORKING EXAMPLE OR GENE SEQUENCE; PRIOR 
ART PUBLICATIONS): a claimed invention required, inter alia, inactivating an “essential” gene in a 
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that is not mentioned in detail in their patent specifications.  This opens 
biomedical firms up to enablement and adequate written description challenges, 
and in the interim, prevents other competing companies from conducting 
research in the patent protected field, due to the possibility of infringing the 
patent. 
There are a few risks that will arise from the approach proposed.  Removing 
provisional patents as an option in the biopharmaceutical field will decrease the 
amount of capital invested into biopharmaceutical firms.  Investors are sensitive 
to risk, and removing provisional patents as an option creates a risk that 
competing firms will file for a patent before the investor’s firm is able.  Due to 
the amount of money required to conduct R&D for biomedical firms, investors 
will be wary of providing capital when the risk of pre-emption is a looming 
threat.  With fewer investors providing capital for research, there will be a 
decrease in the number of innovative products being produced by biologic 
companies.  In addition, it may also encourage biomedical firms to engage in 
more secretive behavior to protect their scientific data, which could result in 
less information being divulged to the public.  The government’s purpose in 
granting patents in the first place is to advance scientific knowledge in the 
national community.195 
However, although these fears may be warranted in certain industries, the 
biomedical field is not one of them.  As mentioned earlier, biologic research is 
a booming field in the United States.196  Despite the small amount of research 
conducted in the area, biologic drugs already account for around a quarter of 
all prescription drug costs.197  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that investors and 
firms will decrease the level of capital they invest into such businesses to 
innovate new products.  In addition, although biomedical companies may 
engage in more secretive behavior if provisional applications were no longer 
allowed, it would only delay dissemination of such information to the public 
until the firm files for a patent. 
 
poxvirus vector; a patent specification complied with the written invention description requirement, 
even though it set forth no working example or gene sequence; prior art publications set forth the 
poxvirus genome and the locations of “essential regions”; testimony indicated that one skilled in the 
art would have been able to locate an “essential” gene, even though that may have required extensive 
time and expense); Adang v. Fischhoff, 286 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001); Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1374 n.10, (Fed. Cir. 1999) (recognizing that “In view 
of the rapid advances in science, . . . what may be unpredictable at one point in time may become 
predictable at a later time.”). 
195. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
196. Schacht, supra note 140, at 3. 
197. Thomas, supra note 7. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the AIA in conjunction with the BPCIA will create 
disincentives to the pioneering of innovative biologic inventions in the 
biomedical field.  These disincentives are a result of the new filing system under 
the AIA, and can only be solved through modification of the BPCIA.  Without 
reform, drug companies will apply for patent protection prematurely, resulting 
in poorly constructed non-innovative patents that receive product exclusivity 
although their patents may be later invalidated.  The best solution to safeguard 
innovation in such circumstances is by modification of the BPCIA so that 
market exclusivity is withdrawn upon invalidation of a biological patent, or by 
denying biological inventors the right to file for provisional patents. 
Biopharmaceutical companies may argue that market exclusivity is 
necessary to promote incentives to innovate in the biomedical field, due to the 
costs associated with developing new biotechnology drugs (around $1.2 
billion).198  Furthermore, they may assert that such protection is necessary due 
to potential generic competition caused by delays in regulatory approval of their 
biologic drugs.  However, economic projections of how well biopharmaceutical 
companies will do in the future, and current estimates on patient spending on 
biological products, contradict these claims. 
In 2012, patient spending on biomedical drugs accounted for around a 
quarter of prescription drug costs, and in fact, increased by 18.4 percent from 
2011.199  Furthermore, revenues from specialty drugs have continued to rise in 
the double-digit territory, and have even outpaced the ten percent growth rate 
seen in 2009 and 2010.200  Therefore, recent data shows that modification of the 
BPCIA will not significantly harm the biopharmaceutical industry. 
So, in light of these modifications, how can the pharmaceutical industry 
continue to produce breakthrough innovations in medicine as revenues come 
under pressure as a consequence of healthcare reform (PPACA), increased 
competition (AIA), and government regulation (BPCIA) in bringing new drugs 
to market?  The answer remains the same: growth opportunities in emerging 
biotechnologies. 
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